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There is only one seller (a monopolist or the aggregate of several individual sellers).
There are n buyers. The whole population of buyers is divided into subpopulations called groups of buyers. Each group has its own characteristic reactions to the market. We call the representative member of group i a buyer of type i. There are k groups, and ni members in group i; :i= ni=n. The number of participants (one seller, nl, n2, ..., nk buyers) does not change over time.
Although the model, as it is formally defined in Section III, is deterministic, it may be viewed as a "hybrid" model, consisting of a collection of deterministic relationships between mean values for stochastic components. In particular, we focus on a sequence of decisions made by the buyers when shopping. At each such decision stage, we model the aggregate behavior of the buyer groups in terms of flows: the inflow of buyers into the decision stage and the flow shares out of the decision stage, corresponding to each decision alternative (there are only two options at each decision stage). However, these deterministic flow shares may be regarded as mean values for stochastic individual choice behavior, the shares being identified as choice probabilities. At other places in the model, we talk about deterministic rates. As in the case of the flow shares, these rates may be interpreted as mean values for stochastic individual behavior. In order to illustrate the deterministic model assumptions, we frequently make such micro-oriented, stochastic interpretations. In the literature on stochastic queue models, our approach is sometimes referred to as "the fluid approximation"; see e.g. Kleinrock (1976) .
The Shopping Algorithm
Shopping is a dynamic process, a series of decisions. Since shopping has some behavioral regularities, the process can be described as an algorithm. The structure of such an algorithm may of course be different for different shopping situations. In the following analysis, we focus on one particular algorithm that we feel has some of the ingredients of real-life situations and yet is analytically tractable. We illustrate the shopping process in Fig. 1 in the form of a block diagram.
We accompany an individual buyer of type i on his shopping route. He departs from the field called START.
His first decision problem is the following. Should he try to buy good G, traded on the market of our model? Or rather, should he buy the substitute good H, traded on another market (outside the scope of our model)? Good H can be a specific close substitute or a composite good, representing the aggregate of all close and distant substitutes for G. We assume that income and all other factors influencing the buyer's decision are given and that they are invariant over time. The only signals to be considered at this decision stage are the prices, i.e. the price ratio ze=pG/PH. We denote the buyer's initial buying propensity by at(z). This is a nonincreasing (usually decreasing) function of r. Given the price ratio n, at(z) is the fraction of buyers of type i that will decide to look for good 0 rather than good H. In micro-oriented terms at(a) may be interpreted as the probability that the buyer will initially prefer good G to good H. So far, we have an orthodox point of departure. The function a,(7) is an ordinary demand function, depending on relative prices; only the technical form is different from the usual, since we need this particular form for our further analysis.
Keep in mind the adjective "initial". It refers to the fact that at(r) represents an original buying intention at the beginning of the shopping route -subject to later revision, after encountering the shortage phenomena. It expresses a hypothetical demand, assuming the absence of shortage.1 The The normal state of the market in a shortage economy 379 fraction a,(n) of the shopping members of group i are willing to spend their money on G, if the good G were available on the supply side without delay.
Our buyer proceeds to the seller's place. There is a queue. He is hesitant: should he join the queue? We assume that there is only one factor influencing his decision, and that is the expected queuing time w. The larger the w, the more reluctant the buyer is to join the queue. The quantity fi(w) expresses the queuing propensity. This means that out of the total number of type i buyers, interested in purchasing good G, a fraction f/(w) will join the queue, and the rest, i.e. the fraction (1 -fi(w)), are not willing to join the queue right now.
Let us assume for a moment that our buyer belongs to the first subgroup, and he enters the queue. He waits, patiently or impatiently, until served, and then he goes home with the newly-acquired good. We suppose that after some time has passed, his desire to acquire another item of good G or H arisesand the whole process begins again. The reasons for renewal of the need will not be discussed. (For example, the buyer uses up the good or it becomes obsolete or out of fashion after a while.) Anyway, out of the total number of G-satisfied buyers at time t, we assume that the fraction yi . dt will exhibit a need to acquire another item (of either G or H) in the infinitesimal time interval (t, t + dt). The assumption that this fraction is independent of the time t is made here for technical convenience. In micro-oriented terms this assumption implies that the satisfaction time, i.e. the time interval from the date when a buyer acquires an item of good G until the date when the renewed need arises, considered as a random variable, has an exponential probability distribution with mean value 1/yi. The quantity yi will be called the (post G) need renewal rate and I/yi will be referred to as the average G-satisfaction time.
We now turn to the other branch of the algorithm, to the buyer who was scared away by the long queuing time. He has different options. He may insist on buying good G, but he postpones the decision of whether or not to join the queue to a later time. This can be a reasonable action in the case of a real "physical" queue: people standing in front of the butcher's shop in the morning, or sitting in the doctor's waiting room.1 The buyer's behavior is described by two attributes. First, there is a postponement propensity denoted by bi. And second, there is a postponement time. After that time has elapsed, that the buyer may apply forced substitution. He may buy more of good H than his hypothetical demand, if waiting time for good G is unacceptably long.
Studying empirical evidence of chronic shortages, we think our assumption is less restrictive, and renders more generality to the description of buyer's behavior.
To avoid terminological confusion, we use different names for these two-partly overlapping, but partly differing-phenomena.
There are some more related, but not strictly identical concepts in our terminology and in the language of the "disequilibrium school". Lack of space does not allow detailed comparison of the conceptual frameworks. 1 It is not a reasonable option in the case of a "notional" queue, e.g. when serial numbers are distributed among the members of the queue, after which everybody may go home and return when called. the buyer returns and considers again: should he join the queue? Here we make a similar assumption as for the G-satisfied buyers, i.e. in the infinitesimal time interval (t, t + dt), the fraction -dt of the total number of postponers in group i will return to reconsider their joining the queue. In micro-oriented terms: the postponement time is an exponentially distributed random variable with mean value l/e. We call i the reconsideration rate and 1/ei the average postponement time.
Another option for those who did not join the queue, but do not postpone the same decision, is to substitute good H for good G. We call this forced substitution, forced by shortage and revealed in the unacceptably long queuing time. There were some people, the fraction (1 -ai(n)) of customers of type i, who made a voluntary substitution, considering exclusively the relative prices of G and H. But now some more substitutioners follow them, on an involuntary basis. Considering relative prices, they would prefer G to Hbut threatened by the long queuing time they would rather revise their initial demand and are willing to accept good H instead of good G. Forced substitution is the key phenomenon in understanding what is happening under chronic shortage. We denote the forced substitution propensity by c~i(2). (As in the case of the initial buying propensity, we assume that the forced substitution propensity depends only on the relative price ar.)
The third option is to give up the purchase of both G and H, and simply keep the money unspent. This can be called shortage forced saving.1
Aware of all these options, we introduce some drastic simplifications in the present expository model. We exclude the possibility of shortage forced saving and assume the following. If the buyer is neither willing to join the queue for G immediately, nor willing to postpone the same decision, then he must be willing to accept forced substitution and to buy good H. This good is always available immediately. One possible interpretation of our assumption is that good H represents the composite commodity "goods other than G". Even in the worst degree of shortage there is always something in the stores. Most of the buyers are willing to spend their money on something, somehow. This is a rather realistic assumption for a very large part of buyers' decisions in a shortage economy.2 Our assumption is represented by the following relationship: b i+c=l 1. For the sake of simpler notation, we use only the term c1 and the postponement propensity will be denoted by (1-ci).
In the case of acquiring good H (due to voluntary or forced choice) the buyer goes through a similar satisfaction time as in the case of good G. In particular, we assume that in the infinitesimal time interval (t, t +dt), the fraction xi dt of all H-satisfied buyers of type i will exhibit a need to acquire another item (of either good G or H). We call xi the (post H) need renewal rate and 1/xf the average H-satisfaction time.
This brings us to the end of the whole cycle. A brief comparison with the usual market models is now in order. As already mentioned, we go along with the traditional description at the first step of the algorithm-the demand function depends on relative prices. The usual model terminates here, with the tacit assumption that it is enough to know what the buyer's intention is. If he wants to buy a given quantity at the price asked for by the seller-he will surely get it. We admit that this tacit assumption is more or less legitimate when excess demand is only exceptional and temporary. It can be applied to the description of a market where automatic forces rapidly eliminate excess demand. But under the circumstances of chronic shortage the same tacit assumption becomes unjustified; the description of the buyer's behavior must not stop here. What will happen after the first step, i.e. after determining the initial demand? In an economy where excess demand is exceptional, buying can be treated as a one-stroke action: a decision regarding purchase intention and actual purchase can be condensed into one moment of time. On the other hand, in a shortage economy, buying may be described only as a process over time, looking at the original decision and later on at the revisions, choice between further options, etc. Therefore, the following dilemmas were introduced into the model: joining the queue, postponing, and accepting forced substitution. (In a forthcoming paper, we will discuss the case of searching buyers.) 
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The State Variables of the
II.5. Service Capacity and Effective Service Flow
In subsections II.2-II.4 we discussed the buyers. We now turn to the description of the seller. In the context of the present model, supply will be represented by service capacity and trade by effective service flow.
The service capacity of the seller is denoted by A. This is the maximal number of buyers who can be served per unit of time. In the case of a store, A depends on the initial inventories and on the deliveries of supplies to the store. In the case of a productive firm, A depends on the initial inventories and on the production capacity. We disregard inventories and assume that A is timeinvariant and fixed exogenously.
As the queue length x1 is treated here as a continuous variable, it would be natural to let the effective service flow, i.e. the actual number of buyers served per time unit, equal A for x1 >0 and zero for x = 0. In other words, full service as long as there is a queue, and no service if there is no queue (the person being served is included in the queue). However, this "switching rule" type of dependency of the effective service flow (s) on the queue length (xl) is discontinuous at x= -0, and such a discontinuity would be technically disturbing in the analysis of the dynamics of the system of buyers. Therefore, we replace this discontinuous relationship by a continuous relationship along with a limit argument. More precisely, first we let the effective service flow (s) depend on the queue length ( It should be noted that this equation may also be used as an approximation in some cases with more than one queue for good G. If there are many queues and the arriving customers always choose the queue with the shortest queuing time, then the queuing times in the different queues will tend to become equal, and equation (2.2) applies to the aggregate of queues.
The queue is comprised of members from the different buyer groups. In general, these groups may be more or less well-mixed in the queue. However, for analytical tractability we assume that they are homogenously mixed. Let si(t) denote the outflow of served buyers of type i at time t: -x(t) (x1(t)) if x1(t) > 0 ,0o 0if x(t) =0 (2.3)
In other words we assume that the outflow of served buyers of type i from the queue is proportional to the share of such buyers among all buyers in the queue. For an initial or transient state of the buyer population, this may indeed be a crude approximation (the queuing members from one buyer group may e.g. stand ahead of all other queuing buyers). In a stationary state, however, the homogeneity assumption is appropriate, granted independent individual behavior.' The quantity si will be referred to as the effective service flow of buyers of type i (i = 1, 2, ..., k), s =s1 +52+ ...+-k.
III. The Model: Formal Summary
After explaining the institutional and microeconomic implications of the model, we are ready to summarize the formal description with some repetition of Section II.
III.1. Exogenous Data
The following parameters are assumed to be exogenously given, fixed real numbers: A, n, y, xi, eQ (i= 1, 2, ..., k). Let R+ denote the set of non-negative real numbers and [0, 1] the closed unit interval. The following functions are assumed to be exogenously given, fixed and defined on R+ and take values in Moreover, h., is twice differentiable and satisfies h,(0)= 0 and h,(x) =l for every x>a.
1 Assumption (2.3) is disturbing from a logical point of view. Namely, in the case of more than one buyer group it may conflict with the interpretation of (2.2) in terms of a strictly ordered queue. An alternative interpretation of (2.2), which is consistent with (2.3), is that the members of the queue are drawn at random for service. Assuming an equal chance of being drawn and average service time per buyer 1/A, equation (2.2) gives the expected queuing time and (2.3) the average service flows for the different groups.
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These assumptions require a few comments.1 First, In A1 we assume that the average H-satisfaction time (l/xi) exceeds the average postponement time (1/ei). In other words we think of situations with "short-term" postponement, as compared to consumption time.
Second, in A4 we assume that if the relative price is so high that type i buyers have zero initial buying propensity, then they have positive propensity for forced substitution.
Third, the smoothing function h. requires a comment. In the subsequent analysis we first derive results for an arbitrary smoothing function h, with ca>0 fixed. We then let a decrease to zero and establish results for this limiting case (to be distinguished from the case ar=0).
III.2. Dynamic Relationships
As was indicated above, we will describe the dynamic evolution over time of the population state variables xli(t),(t2(t), x3s(t) and x4(t), i-= 1, 2, ..., k, in terms of a system of (non-linear) ordinary differential equations. The system is given below (for i= 1, 2, ..., k): Here all state variables as well as the service rates and queuing time are functions of time, x1= x-(t), etc. The service rate s, is defined in equations (2.1) and (2.3), and the queuing time w is defined in equation (2.2). The terms "as" and "ci" are abbreviations for "as(n)" and "cj(n)", the relative price 7 being constant. The dot notation signifies time derivatives, x=x(t) = dx(t)ldt.
Note that the sum of the time derivatives is zero, x,+x2s+ X3+ x4-= 0, reflecting the assumption that the number of buyers in each group is constant. Moreover, no state variable can take a negative value; for any feasible state (xji) with xjs=0 for some j and i, we have x)j>O by equations (3.1) to (3.4). Thus the solution to the system of differential equations is bounded at all times t > 0. In force of the assumed continuity of the first derivatives f[ and h',a this guarantees the existence and uniqueness of the solution at all times t > 0; cf. Theorem 3.1 in Chapter I of Hale (1969) . 
IV.2. Stability
Only the special case of one group of buyers will be considered here; thus k=1 and the subscript i will be deleted. In the preceding subsection it was shown that if A < i, then xl(a) approaches a positive value as the smoothing coefficient a approaches zero, while xl(a) approaches zero for A>)+ . This motivates a division of the stability analysis into two cases. For the case A< , a sufficient condition for stability is that the queuing propensity function / is "smooth" for all positive queuing times. For the opposite case, 2 > i, it is sufficient that / is "flat" at zero queuing time.
Proposition 2. Consider a buyer population consisting of only one group, k = 1, and assume a(n) >0.
(a) Suppose A <0. Assume that A 1-A5 hold and moreover that the queuing propensity function f has a second derivative /" for every w >0. There then exists an e>0 such that the stationary state is asymptotically stable for every smoothing coefficient a E (0, e).
(b) Suppose A> . Assume that A1-A5 hold and moreover that the queuing propensity function / is identically equal to unity in some interval (0, 6). Then the stationary state is asymptotically stable for every smoothing coefficient aE(0, A.(6).
As already mentioned, the above proposition does not tell us how the system reacts to large perturbations away from its stationary state. So far, we have no general results concerning the global behavior of the system. However, for the special case where the possibility of postponement is excluded, it may be shown that the stationary state is indeed globally stable, i.e. the system returns to its stationary state at arbitraiily large perturbations. If assumptions A1-A5 are satisfied, then the system converges asymptotically to its stationary state from any initial state.
As a complement to the analytical stability studies above concerning the special case of one buyer group (k = 1), a few numerical computer simulations have been made for the case of two buyer groups (k= 2). Admitting that we have made no extensive simulation studies, we are able to say that all simulations so far show global stability of the system. On the basis of our simulations we make the following conjecture.
Conjecture. At least for the case of two buyer groups, k = 2, there is a fairly wide class of exogenous parameters and functions satisfying assumptions A1-A5, for which the corresponding stationary states are globally stable.
IV.3 Walrasian and Non-Walrasian Long-term Equilibrium
When xl-=xi, ..., x4*=x4, i=1, ..., k, the system is in its normal state. Some words of explanation and interpretation concerning the term "normal" will be in order.
In an empirical descriptive interpreation of the model, the implication is this: the normal value is the intertemporal mean of a state variable. Hence our model is suitable only as a description of a stagnating market. Our conjecture is, however, that the results can be generalized for systems where supply, trade and consumption are changing (e.g. increasing) over time. (One might, for example, consider "immigration" of new potential buyers into the market for good G.) In that case we have to redefine the concept of the normal state, which becomes a relative term (x1j(t)/ni(t)=c for all t and every i,j). In subsequent comments we refer to the generalized interpretation of the term "normal state", where the stationary state of our model is only a special case.
For a meaningful interpretation, two formally distinct problems-existence and stability-are thoroughly interconnected. To call any intertemporal mean a "normal value" would be a tautological re-naming. What makes an intertemporal mean a "normal value" indeed is the operation of a feedback mechanism, assuring that the system, departing from its normal state, will be brought "back to normal". In our simple model the signal guiding the feedback mechanism is w, the queuing time. If queuing takes too long a time, buyers will refrain from joining. If, on the contrary, queuing time is shorter than normal, this will attract more people to join the queue.
In addition to existence and stability, we also have a proposition of uniqueness of the stationary state. This is not an indispensable implication of the concept of a normal state. Our uniqueness proposition is due, among other assumptions, to the deterministic framework of the model. In a stochastic setting, the (unique) stationary state in the present deterministic model must be replaced by a (unique) stationary probability distribution for the state of the system.
The normal state could also be called the long-term equilibrium of the system.1 There is, however, some terminological confusion and vagueness in the economic literature, because the term "equilibrium" has strong connotations in the traditions of the profession. Many economists are inclined to restrict the use of this term to denominate a system in Walrasian equilibrium. Let us illustrate the problem by considering the present model. The market is in a kind of long-term Walrasian equilibrium if xl=0 and xi=0 at all times. Under certain conditions, which we discuss later on, this may be the case. But then there are other, non-Walrasian equilibria as well, including normal states with positive queues. The Walrasian equilibria here only constitute a subset of the set of normal states.
Many economists would call such steady states disequilibria. Precisely the new stream of research referred to in the introduction is usually called "disequilibrium theory".2 This is not merely a semantic question; in the mind (or in the back of the mind) names are usually associated with value judgements. To put it in very simple terms: 90 out of 100 economists will consider equilibrium as "good", worthwhile to be maintained, or if lost, to be restored. Therefore, "disequilibrium" is something "bad", and therefore it must be avoided. And if "disequilibrium" becomes long-lasting and chronic, it is a sign of degeneration, a perverse state of the system; it is something "abnormal".
We like the term "normal value" as a synonym for "long-term equilibrium value", or "steady-state value", because it indicates a descriptive statement, without judgement. The characteristics of a normal state are system specific. When we say: there are systems which will have queues in their normal state, this implies: there are no feedback mechanisms, no social forces in the system driving it toward a Walrasian state. On the contrary, such an economy has some important properties, deeply embedded in the very nature of the system, which permanently restore the normal length of the queue, and so on.
Any normal state, including non-Walrasian equilibria, can be self-reproducing, self-perpetuating only because it is accepted as normal by the members of the system. Queuing, waiting, postponing purchases in spite of available financial means, forced substitution-these are social costs, paid by the buyer, in addition to the regular price, paid in money. The propensities to join the queue, to implement forced substitution, to postpone the purchase, i.e. our functions /i, ci, and (1-ci), respectively, express the extent to which the buyers are willing to pay these non-financial social costs of getting the desired goods. They indicate the socially institutionalized acceptance of the conditions prevailing on the market.
V. Dependency of the Normal State on Exogenous Data
V.1. Introductory Remarks
We now turn to a study of the normal state in the limiting case a 0, the state variables thus being given in corollaries 1.1 and 1.2. We will compare normal state stocks and flows corresponding to different collections of parameter values and functions satisfying assumptions A 1-A5. Although we are dealing with a dynamic model, a comparison of different normal states of the system leads to results similar to the usual comparative static exercises.
First of all the crucial parametric quantity < defined in equation (4.1) requires a closer look. According to corollaries 1.1 and 1.2 this quantity is the minimal queue clearing service capacity, i.e. if the service capacity 2 is less than this number, then there will be a queue in the normal state, while there will be no queue in the normal state if 2 equals or exceeds b. Observe that f depends only on the relative price -x, the initial buying propensity functions ai, the need renewal rates yi and xi and the sizes of the buyer groups ni, while it is independent of the queuing propensities fi, forced substitution propensities ci, reconsideration rates ~ and of course of the service capacity A. The quantity ( thus reflects the buyers' attitude concerning price, and their consumption rates. Because of this role of b it is natural to relate it to the concept of demand, and actually b may be interpreted in terms of longterm potential demand. Namely, for any normal state with no queuing, the inflow (per time unit) of buyers to the shop or service facility is precisely b; cf. Fig. 2 and corollary 1.2 . Thus, for any given collection of parameters and functions describing the buyers' attitude and behavior, the quantity ( is the number of requests for good G per time unit that would be made by this population of buyers if the system were in a normal state without queuing. Therefore the quantity may be called the potential demand (flow), generated by the buyer population, where each buyer requests one unit of the good at each purchase. (The quantity < generally differs from the flow of potential requests in a particular normal state with queuing. The latter flow, consisting of buyers that would request good G if they did not have to queue, may be calculated from the equations in corollary 1.1.)
Having considered the meaning of the quantity <, we now return to a study of the dependency of the normal state on the service capacity, the relative price and some components of the buyers' attitude. In such a study there are many aspects of the normal state that require consideration. A natural description of the normal state is simply the distribution of the buyers over the four possible states "queuing", "G-satisfied", "H-satisfied" and "postponing", as specified by the normal values of the state variables themselves. However, as a complement to these quantities one may also consider the flow of potential customers, i.e., the flow of buyers that would buy good G if it were available without queuing (we think of the flow into the last decision point before the queue in Figs 1 and 2) . In general, this flow splits into three sub-flows: one going to the queue, the other to forced substitution and the third to postponement. In a normal state, these flows represent the shares (i=l1, 2, ..., k) The normal queue length x1 requires a comment. At first glance, one might believe that the qualitative result above would hold also for the normal queue length, i.e. a higher service capacity would yield a shorter queue. However, in the present model we have assumed that it is the queuing time, and not the number of persons in the queue, that influences a potential customer's propensity to join the queue. Therefore, the normal queue length may be related to the service capacity in a non-monotonic way under fairly reasonable assumptions about the queuing propensity functions. This is the case, for example, if there is a finite upper bound on acceptable queuing time, or, more precisely, if there is a finite w0 such that fi(wo)=0 for i =l1, 2, ..., k. dependency of the queue length on the service capacity in a typical case is illustrated in Fig. 3 . In sum: a higher service capacity yields a shorter normal queuing time but not necessarily a shorter queue.
V.3. Dependency on the Price
We now study how the normal state depends on the relative price a, all other parameters and functions being fixed (in particular A being a constant). Before studying the normal state variables, however, we should make some observations about the "long-term potential demand" (. In other words, there is always a relative price high enough to make the corresponding normal state queue-less. However attactive such a normal state may seem, it should be observed that although there is no queuing at prices above n0, the situation is not better in terms of the number of persons served. It is easily verified from corollaries 1.1 and 1.2 that the normal service rate s* satisfies the equation s* =min (A, s). Thus, as a function of the relative price n, the normal service rate is constantly equal to A in the price interval (0, n0] while it declines with S in the price interval (n0, + oo).
As the minimal queue clearing price n0 renders the long-term potential demand S equal to the service capacity A, it can be regarded as the Walrasian market clearing price. This price is unique in the deterministic framework of the present model. Below that price there will always be a queue, above it there will never be a queue, ceteris paribus. Let us now consider what happens to the normal queuing time if a low relative price is raised. Intuitively one would expect the normal queuing time corresponding to a higher price not to exceed the normal queuing time corresponding to a lower price. In terms of the present model, this relationship indeed holds.
Observation 4. The normal queuing time w* is a continuous function of the relative price a. For prices in the interval (0, n0) it is positive and nonincreasing, while it is constantly equal to zero for prices >n0.
In sum: a higher relative price never yields a longer normal queuing time, and there is always a relative price high enough to make the corresponding normal state queue-less. In other words: higher forced substitution propensities never yield a longer normal queuing time.
V.4. Dependency on the Queuing and Forced Substitution Propensities
Observations 5 and 6 support the remark made at the end of Section IV.3. The constellation of the state variables will depend on the attitude of the buyers in the different groups. Also, there is some "trade-off" between the different non-financial costs of shortage. As such costs we have in mind queuing, postponement and forced substitution. Observation 6 illustrates one such trade-off. The buyers can achieve a shorter queuing time if they are more willing to accept forced substitution. In general, a decrease in one of these costs, without an increase in other non-financial costs, can be assured only by changing the ultimate determining factors: the consumption and voluntary substitution patterns on one hand and/or the service capacity and price on the other.
As a final remark we note that shifts in the "market control variables" A and a, as well as shifts in the buyers' attitude, in general have distributional effects across buyer groups. For instance, an increase in the relative price may redirect more price-sensitive buyer groups to substitution, while other, less price-sensitive groups may only get a shorter queuing time without changed consumption pattern. Also, an increased propensity for forced substitution in one buyer group may benefit other groups through a shorter queuing time.
Thus, in addition to the problem of distribution of income, in money terms, which is well studied in the literature, we have here another important aspect: the distribution of non-financial social costs of consumption among the different groups of the population.
VI. Further Extensions
This paper is only a first step in the study of a large set of problems. The analysis is kept within very narrow boundaries, using drastic simplifications, mainly for expository purposes. Observation 4. A sufficient condition for the monotonicity result is that the quantity G(w), for any fixed w >0, does not increase with a. A study of the price dependency of A,(w)/ca(7) gives the condition.
